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INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of patent law is to promote technological 
progress.1  To this end, a patent generally provides an inventor with the 
incentive of a temporary monopoly on the right to make, use, and sell a 
patented invention,2 in return for full public disclosure of the invention.3  
However, both the incentive to invent and the reward for inventing may 
have unintended and undesirable consequences because the harm 
caused by some inventions, or in some cases simply by the grant of the 
monopoly, may outweigh the benefits of the disclosure.  On one hand, 
society may not wish to provide an incentive to invent in areas where 
the potentially harmful effects of an invention outweigh its putative 
benefits.  On the other hand, even for an entirely beneficial invention, 
providing a patent may limit public access to the invention by allowing 
monopolistic pricing during the term of the patent.  In such cases, the 
patent incentive is arguably misplaced. 
Rather than ignoring the unintended—but nonetheless, harmful—
effects of granting a patent, and focusing solely on maximizing the 
economic benefit to the inventor, patent law should counteract those 
effects by selectively limiting both the incentive to invent and the 
reward for inventing.  This Article examines the undesirable 
consequences that may result from the patent incentive currently 
provided under U.S. and international law, and proposes a method by 
which those impacts can be limited by selectively narrowing the legal 
scope of patentability. 
In this country, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) is required by federal law to grant patents without 
considering either an invention’s possible harmful impacts or the effects 
on public health of monopoly pricing resulting from a patent.4  Instead, 
U.S. law requires only a showing of utility, novelty, and 
 
 1. In the United States, this goal is explicitly announced in the Constitution, which 
authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (defining infringement of a U.S. patent). 
 3. Id. § 112 (describing the requirements of patent disclosure). 
 4. See id. §§ 101–103, 131, 151.  Patentable subject matter is broadly defined and does 
not generally exclude inventions on the basis of their possible future impacts on public health 
or the environment.  This Article will consider in more detail the current U.S. patent system, 
including currently excluded subject matter.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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nonobviousness,5 with patentable subject matter broadly defined to 
include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”6  This policy has 
two important consequences.  First, the USPTO routinely grants patents 
for inventions that are harmful to the environment and public health.7  
Second, by indiscriminately granting patents on beneficial inventions, 
U.S. law allows monopoly pricing of many such inventions without 
regard to the impact of such pricing.  This may, for example, contribute 
to the high costs of pharmaceuticals and of health care generally in this 
country.8  Although such costs may be appropriate in the United 
States—and in other highly industrialized and relatively wealthy 
nations9—monopoly power can severely limit access to pharmaceutical 
drugs and other beneficial inventions in developing nations.  The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that many developing nations lack 
the effective antitrust regulations of the United States. 
 
 5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.  In addition, a patent application must meet various formal and 
procedural requirements.  Id. § 112. 
 6. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. 
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 7. For example, the USPTO has granted at least seventeen patents for inventions 
claiming aerosol uses of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) since the United States signed the 
Montreal Protocol banning production of CFCs in 1990.  These patents are all directed to 
using CFCs as blowing agents to produce various types of aerated materials:  U.S. Patent No. 
5,605,936 (filed Mar. 28, 1996) (issued Feb. 25, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,686 (filed Feb. 10, 
1994) (issued Dec. 2, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,426,126 (filed Dec. 30, 1992) (issued June 20, 
1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,199,962 (filed Feb. 14, 1992) (issued Apr. 6, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 
5,140,052 (filed Feb. 3, 1992) (issued Apr. 18, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,162,384 (filed Sep. 13, 
1991) (issued Nov. 10, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,089,033 (filed July 2, 1991) (issued Feb. 4, 
1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,286,759 (filed Mar. 8, 1991) (issued Feb. 15, 1994); U.S. Patent No. 
5,086,083 (filed Jan. 30, 1991) (issued Feb. 18, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,102,923 (filed Jan. 14, 
1991) (issued Apr. 7, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 5,030,664 (filed Dec. 4, 1990) (issued July 9, 
1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,250,582 (filed July 23, 1990) (issued Oct. 5, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 
5,071,881 (filed May 22, 1990) (issued Dec. 10, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 4,960,804 (filed Mar. 30, 
1990) (issued Oct. 2, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 5,001,164 (filed Aug. 19, 1988) (issued Mar. 19, 
1991); U.S. Patent No. 4,994,217 (filed Dec. 29, 1988) (issued Feb. 19, 1991); and U.S. Patent 
No. 4,992,222 (filed Dec. 29, 1988) (issued Feb. 12, 1991). 
 8. For example, one recent study found that in the year 2000, the average cost of 
pharmaceuticals in the United States was the highest among a group of eight industrialized 
nations, and it was up to 3.5 times greater than the cost of the same drugs in the other 
countries studied, which included Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Spain, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, INTERNATIONAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE DIFFERENCES:  RESEARCH REPORT (2001), available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/study/pbsprices/finalreport/pbsprices.pdf. 
 9. The United States currently ranks seventh in the world in gross domestic product, at 
$41,600 per capita.  CIA, The World Factbook, Rank Order, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter CIA 
World Factbook]. 
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Denying a patent based on the potentially harmful impacts of an 
invention is complicated by the fact that scientific consensus regarding 
the environmental and public health impacts of a new technology often 
arrives years, or even decades, after the technology itself.  In the 
interim, the state of knowledge regarding the potential impacts of an 
invention generally progresses from scientific ignorance, when any 
harmful impacts of the invention are completely unknown and 
unsuspected, to scientific uncertainty, when harmful impacts are 
suggested by some scientific evidence, but the scientific community has 
not yet reached consensus, and finally to scientific certainty, when 
harmful impacts, if any, are well accepted by the scientific community.  
For example, the USPTO granted the first patents on 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for use as refrigerants in the early 1930s,10 
and CFCs were still considered “miracle chemicals” as late as the 
1950s.11  However, scientists later hypothesized that chlorine radicals 
from CFCs destroy atmospheric ozone,12 resulting in a wide range of 
harmful impacts.13  In the late 1980s, scientists accepted as conclusive the 
link between CFC emissions and ozone depletion,14 and in 1990, the 
United States signed an international treaty banning CFCs from 
production starting in 2000.15  There are many other notable examples of 
 
 10. U.S. Patent No. 1,833,847 (filed Feb. 8, 1930) (issued Nov. 24, 1931); U.S. Patent No. 
1,886,339 (filed Dec. 31, 1928) (issued Nov. 1, 1932). 
 11. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 115, 132 (2004). 
 12. Mario J. Molina & F.S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes:  
Chlorine Atomc-atalysed [sic] Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). 
 13. These include, for example, harm to the skin, eyes, and immune systems of humans 
and animals.  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON 
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER:  2002 ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT PANEL (2003), available at http://ozone.unep. 
org/teap/Reports/TEAP_Reports/TEAP2002.pdf; UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER:  1998 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT PANEL (1998) 
[hereinafter UNEP ASSESSMENT REPORT 1998], available at http://ozone.unep.org/teap/ 
Reports/TEAP_Reports/TEAPAS98.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., J.G. Anderson et al., Ozone Destruction by Chlorine Radicals Within the 
Antarctic Vortex:  The Spatial and Temporal Evolution of ClO-O3 Anticorrelation Based on in 
Situ ER-2 Data, 94 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 11,465, 11,465–79 (1989) (finding a conclusive link 
between chlorine molecules dissociated from CFCs and stratospheric ozone depletion). 
 15. Montreal Protocol Parties:  Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537, 539 
[hereinafter Amendment to the Montreal Protocol].  There are limited exceptions to the ban 
for “essential uses,” defined roughly as uses necessary for public health and safety.  The only 
currently allowed essential uses of CFCs in the United States are in the space program, as a 
propellant for metered dose inhalers, and when necessary for laboratory research.  See U.S. 
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patented innovations that have later proven harmful, two of which— 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and asbestos—will be discussed 
in more detail below.16 
Analyzing the effects of patentability on the pricing of beneficial 
inventions is also complicated, but by economic rather than scientific 
considerations.  Although granting a patent for an invention results in 
less competition and higher prices in the marketplace, removing the 
patent incentive entirely gives rise to the possibility that a product will 
never reach the market at all.  For some of the most beneficial products, 
such as pharmaceuticals, research and development involves large sunk 
costs, lengthy development times, and great financial risk.  As a result, 
the lure of monopoly pricing may be the deciding factor that induces a 
company to develop the product in the first place.  Therefore, any 
proposal to limit patent rights must maintain a financial incentive 
sufficient to justify the risk and expense of developing beneficial new 
products.  In other words, the law should strike a balance between 
providing inventors with a sufficient incentive to invent, and maximizing 
the number of people who can afford to purchase the resulting products.  
A key to striking this balance may lie in the large disparity in wealth 
among various nations.  For example, in 2004, per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) ranged from a low of $400 in East Timor to a high of 
$69,900 in Bermuda,17 a difference of more than two orders of 
magnitude.  As this huge discrepancy indicates, regardless of the 
presence or absence of a patent incentive, the citizens of different 
nations are not equally able either to develop high-cost inventions or to 
pay monopoly prices for those inventions. 
 
EPA, Essential Use Exemptions and Metered Dose Inhalers (MDIs), http://www.epa.gov/ 
ozone/title6/phaseout/mdi/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2006) (listing the current essential use 
exemptions and describing the requirements for a use to be essential under the Montreal 
Protocol). 
 16. DDT was first patented in the United States as a highly promising insecticide in 
1943.  U.S. Patent No. 2,329,074 (filed Mar. 4, 1941) (issued Sept. 7, 1943).  It was eventually 
banned in 1973 due to its negative ecological and public health impacts.  Press Release, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, DDT Ban Takes Effect (Dec. 31, 1972) [hereinafter DDT Ban Press 
Release], available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/ddt/01.htm.  Asbestos was first 
patented in 1828 as an insulating material in steam engines and ultimately banned from most 
products as a carcinogen in 1989.  See Chris Obrion, Asbestos Through the Ages, THE 
ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at A1, available at http://whitepages.roanoke.com/roatimes/ 
special_sections/asbestos/asbestostimeline10_5.pdf (outlining the history and evolution of 
patents); U.S. EPA, Asbestos Ban and Phase Out, http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/ 
ban.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2006) [hereinafter EPA Asbestos Ban] (explaining the EPA 
final rule to ban asbestos-containing products).  See infra Part I. 
 17. CIA World Factbook, supra note 9. 
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This Article examines the environmental and public health 
consequences of patent laws around the world and argues that the 
patent incentive should be selectively removed to mitigate the harmful 
effects of granting patents without regard to the invention-specific 
impacts of doing so.  After examining the scope of patentable subject 
matter provided by the domestic laws of the United States, the laws of 
other nations, and several international treaties, I conclude that 
patentable subject matter should be universally limited to exclude from 
patentability inventions that are known or strongly suspected to cause 
certain sufficiently harmful impacts, and it should be selectively limited 
to exclude from patentability certain classes of beneficial inventions in 
developing nations. 
Part I examines the phenomenon of the undesirable patent, 
exploring, in particular, several past instances in which the widespread 
use of a patent has led to significant environmental and public health 
consequences.  In the context of such cases, I will explore the extent to 
which patent laws not only permitted, but facilitated, the development 
of harmful technologies.  Part II examines various national laws and 
international treaties that address the scope of patentability.  This 
includes a brief examination of the evolution of U.S. patent law toward 
an increasingly broader scope of patentable subject matter without 
adequate evaluation of the public welfare impacts of patents.  I then 
focus, in particular, on the attempts by other nations to institute 
precautionary measures to mitigate harms caused by unlimited patent 
incentives.  Part III offers an assessment of the current inadequacies of 
existing patent laws, ultimately concluding that placing selective limits 
on the scope of patentable subject matter, which will exclude protection 
for some inventions, is warranted as a necessary means to counteract the 
possible undesirable effects of unrestrained patent incentives.  Part III 
also presents some specific suggestions regarding the proper scope of 
patentability, including an examination of what should be excluded in 
accordance with necessary public policy considerations. 
I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
PATENTED TECHNOLOGY 
As technology evolves, opportunities for improvement are identified 
and instituted, but the passage of time may also bring with it new 
information and insight into the unintended consequences of that 
technology.  Our understanding of the implications of various patented 
technologies for the environment and public health progresses through 
eras of scientific ignorance, uncertainty, and then finally to some degree 
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of certainty regarding the potential consequences.  Throughout this 
time, successive generations of improvements and modifications 
typically result in the issuance of an increasing array of patents. 
An examination of past practice of the USPTO in granting patents 
for inventions at various times during the evolution of scientific 
knowledge concerning the impacts of the underlying technology is 
instructive in better understanding this phenomenon.  In three notable 
cases involving CFCs, DDT, and asbestos, patents were issued for 
substances that the scientific community ultimately—and universally—
later came to recognize and accept caused serious harm to the 
environment and public health.  Yet in each of these instances, the 
USPTO granted related patents not only during the era of scientific 
ignorance, but also at times of scientific uncertainty and certainty 
regarding the harm caused by the substances. 
One of the most dramatic illustrations of how U.S. law keeps the 
patent incentive in place, regardless of whether harmful impacts of a 
technology are suspected or known with scientific certainty, is the case 
with respect to CFCs.  CFCs are a class of synthetic chemicals and were 
introduced in the United States in the early 1930s as an ostensibly safer 
alternative to refrigerants such as sulfur dioxide and the ammonia-based 
refrigerants that were then commonly used.18  Shortly thereafter, the 
USPTO began granting U.S. patents related to CFCs.19 Unfortunately, 
scientists later determined that the widespread use of CFCs as 
refrigerants, aerosol propellants, cleaning solvents, and blowing agents20 
had led to depletion of stratospheric ozone in the earth’s atmosphere, 
resulting in a variety of serious environmental and public health 
consequences due to increased transmission of ultraviolet radiation to 
the earth’s surface.21  However, the link between stratospheric ozone 
depletion and CFCs in the atmosphere was not hypothesized until 
 
 18. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE:  ARE WE THREATENING OUR 
FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL?  A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY 243 (1996); 
Glenn B. Raiczyk, Future Development, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer:  Conference Calling for Accelerated Phase-out of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals Is 
Planned for 1992, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 363, 365–66 (1992). 
 19. U.S. Patent No. 1,833,847 (filed Feb. 8, 1930) (issued Nov. 24, 1931); U.S. Patent No. 
1,886,339 (filed Dec. 30, 1928) (issued Nov. 1, 1932). 
 20. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON 
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER:  1991 ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT PANEL § 2.1 (1991), available at 
http://www.ciesin.org/docs/011-494/011-494.html (describing the various uses of CFCs). 
 21. See generally, e.g., UNEP ASSESSMENT REPORT 1998, supra note 13. 
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1974,22 and the scientific community only accepted this link as 
conclusively proven in 1987,23 at which time the patent incentive for 
development of CFC-related inventions had already been in place for 
over fifty years. 
Although the original CFC patents were granted—and expired—
during an era of scientific ignorance with regard to the harmful effects 
of CFCs on the ozone layer, the USPTO continued granting CFC-
related patents throughout the subsequent eras of scientific uncertainty 
and certainty regarding the destructive effects of the compounds.  For 
example, during the era of scientific uncertainty between 1974 and 1987, 
the USPTO granted several new patents for CFC-related aerosol 
products,24 irrespective of the debate then being waged between 
environmentalists—who asserted a link between CFCs and atmospheric 
ozone depletion—and the CFC industry, which consistently denied any 
such link.25  Even in the post-1987 era of relative scientific certainty 
regarding the negative impacts of CFCs, the USPTO continued granting 
new patents for CFC-related products and methods.  Disturbingly, the 
USPTO continued this practice even after twenty-three primary CFC-
producing nations, including the United States, signed the Montreal 
Protocol26 in an effort to reduce CFC concentrations in the atmosphere.  
Despite such a clear indication of a national policy to avoid further 
production and dissemination of CFCs, and even after the United States 
signed the Protocol’s 1990 amendment requiring a phase out of CFC 
production by the year 2000,27 the USPTO granted at least seventeen 
patents specifying aerosol uses of CFCs.28 
A second example illustrating the USPTO practice of granting 
patents on environmentally toxic substances is DDT.  DDT is an organic 
chemical compound that was introduced commercially in 1938 as a 
 
 22. Molina & Rowland, supra note 12. 
 23. See Anderson et al., supra note 14 (finding a conclusive link between chlorine 
molecules dissociated from CFCs and stratospheric ozone depletion). 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,508,631 (filed Aug. 2, 1983) (issued Apr. 2, 1985) 
(claiming a dehydrating refrigeration fluid including a CFC refrigerant); U.S. Patent No. 
4,407,982 (filed Feb. 3, 1982) (issued Oct. 4, 1983) (claiming a method of producing 
polyurethane foam including use of a CFC blowing agent); U.S. Patent No. 4,518,557 (filed 
May 18, 1981) (issued May 21, 1985) (claiming a method of producing a polymer plastic using 
a CFC blowing agent); U.S. Patent No. 4,174,295 (filed Aug. 9, 1977) (issued Nov. 13, 1979) 
(claiming an aerosol propellant including 40–95% CFCs by weight). 
 25. Anderson et al., supra note 14, at 12. 
 26. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
 27. See Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, supra note 15. 
 28. See supra note 7. 
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highly promising insecticide with the potential to curtail insect-borne 
diseases.29  Since its introduction, DDT has been successfully used in 
many countries to combat epidemics of such serious illnesses as typhus 
and malaria.30  However, questions about the harmful environmental 
effects of DDT quickly arose, and scientists began voicing reservations 
about DDT “almost as soon as it first went into use”31 because it was 
found to persist in soil “for several years and could become magnified in 
a food chain.”32  Scientists now classify DDT as a “persistent organic 
pollutant”33 (POP), and it is well-accepted that DDT in the environment 
leads to a number of adverse human health effects, including genital 
abnormalities and decreased fertility.34 
However, as required by current U.S. law, the USPTO continued to 
grant DDT-related patents when the era of scientific ignorance 
regarding DDT ended and even after scientific uncertainty gave rise to 
an era of scientific certainty about DDT’s harmful effects.  As in the 
case of CFCs, the patent incentive for DDT remained in place even 
when other U.S. government action clearly indicated the existence of a 
national policy to eliminate virtually all domestic use of the chemical.  
Specifically, studies commissioned by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) in the late 1960s confirmed that DDT had 
numerous harmful consequences and persisted residually in the 
environment,35 and as a result, the USDA cancelled the registration of 
many uses of DDT in 1969, effectively outlawing harmful uses of the 
chemical.36  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) followed 
suit in 1973 by banning the domestic use of DDT due to its negative 
ecological and public health impacts,37 subject to a small number of 
public health exceptions.38  However, despite these actions by other U.S. 
 
 29. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 18, at 68. 
 30. History of POPs Discovery, Use and Ban, http://www.cneac.com/article/list. 
asp?id=25 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Elizabeth B. Baldwin, Note, Reclaiming Our Future:  International Efforts to 
Eliminate the Threat of Persitent [sic] Organic Pollutants, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 855, 856 (1997) (describing compounds classified as POPs and their global effects). 
 34. Id. at 857. 
 35. N. AM. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, HISTORY OF DDT IN NORTH 
AMERICA TO 1997, http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/POLLUTANTS/HistoryDDTe_EN.PDF 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2006) [hereinafter HISTORY OF DDT]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. DDT Ban Press Release, supra note 16. 
 38. These exceptions include “[p]ublic health, quarantine, and a few minor crop 
uses . . . as well as export of the material.”  Id.  Export of DDT is permitted because DDT is 
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government agencies, the USPTO continued to grant patents for 
inventions related to insecticidal use of DDT.39  Under U.S. patent law, 
the USPTO would be legally compelled to grant such a patent even 
now, if an inventor met all of the statutory requirements for 
patentability.40 
A third and especially compelling example is that of asbestos-related 
inventions, which illustrates how the state of knowledge regarding the 
effects of a substance on public health has no impact on the 
patentability of the substance under U.S. law.  Processed asbestos fibers 
are very strong and have excellent insulating properties, and as a result 
asbestos has been used for centuries in many products.  These products 
include, for example, floor tiles, plaster, wallboard, pipe insulation, and 
roof shingles, among many others.41  However, asbestos is 
carcinogenic—particularly when inhaled—and human exposure to its 
dust can lead to a host of maladies, including cancers such as lung cancer 
and mesothelioma, among others.42 
Health hazards related to asbestos have been known since at least 
1898, when factory inspectors noticed the harmful consequences of 
breathing asbestos particles.43 More generally, asbestos has a long and 
well-documented history of producing human illness among those 
exposed to the substance.  Asbestosis, a scarring of the lungs that can 
 
still considered the best way to prevent the spread of malaria in some developing nations, 
despite its adverse effects.  Id. 
 39. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,751,082 (filed Aug. 20, 1986) (issued June 14, 1988) 
(claiming an insecticide comprising a combination of DDT and a fungus); U.S. Patent No. 
3,400,093 (filed Mar. 11, 1966) (issued Sept. 3, 1968) (claiming an insecticide solution 
comprising DDT); U.S. Patent No. 2,329,074 (filed Mar. 4, 1941) (issued Sept. 7, 1943) (the 
original DDT patent).  Note that in contrast to the case of CFCs, the export market for DDT 
has provided a production incentive extending beyond the final ban on domestic use of the 
chemical. 
 40. Although DDT is not currently manufactured in the United States, its manufacture 
and export are in fact not prohibited by law, presenting a possible market incentive to further 
develop products related to its pesticidal use in other nations.  See HISTORY OF DDT, supra 
note 35, at 2 (noting that Congress has not yet acted to prohibit domestic production of 
DDT). 
 41. See Where Can Asbestos Be Found?, http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/asbuses.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (listing several dozen categories of products in which asbestos is 
commonly found). 
 42. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS:  MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 90–100 (1984). 
 43. See EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS:  THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 1 (Poul Harremoẽs et al. eds., 2002) 
(noting that although a factory inspector in the United Kingdom observed the harmful effects 
of white asbestos dust on factory workers in 1898, the government of the United Kingdom did 
not ban the substance until one hundred years later, resulting in hundreds of thousands of 
arguably foreseeable deaths). 
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lead to breathing problems and heart failure, “was by 1935 widely 
recognized as a mortal threat affecting a large fraction of those who had 
regularly worked with the material.”44  An international panel of lung 
cancer experts, chaired by an American doctor affiliated with the U.S. 
National Cancer Institute, convened in 1952 to discuss recent worldwide 
increases in the rate of lung cancer.45  The following year, the panel 
published a report—the so-called “Louvain report” of 1953—
unequivocally acknowledging that asbestos was carcinogenic.46  Action 
by the U.S. government eventually followed in 1989, when the EPA 
formally banned the production and sale of most products containing 
asbestos.47  Although this ban was later partially reversed by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,48 the reversal was for legal rather 
than scientific reasons,49 and many asbestos-containing products remain 
banned domestically as a result of the 1989 EPA action. 
Nevertheless, the USPTO has been continuously granting patents 
for asbestos-containing products since the early nineteenth century.50  
Because patentability in this country is completely decoupled from 
actions by other U.S. government agencies relating to public health, the 
patent incentive for asbestos-related inventions remains in place despite 
even the formal ban on asbestos by the EPA, and the USPTO has 
granted many patents on asbestos-containing products since then.51  Put 
differently, despite a longstanding era of scientific certainty with respect 
to the harmful public health impacts of asbestos, the USPTO has 
continued to grant U.S. patents for asbestos-containing inventions 
essentially up to the present day. 
Furthermore, the cases of CFCs, DDT, and asbestos are by no 
means isolated.  Other notable instances of patented technologies that 
 
 44. CASTLEMAN, supra note 42, at 31. 
 45. Id. at 68. 
 46. Id. 
 47. EPA Asbestos Ban, supra note 16. 
 48. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir.   
1991). 
 49. See id. at 1229 (describing the EPA’s failure to consider congressionally mandated 
alternatives to an outright ban as the basis for the Fifth Circuit’s decision partially reversing 
the ban). 
 50. See Obrion, supra note 16 (describing the first U.S. patent for an asbestos-
containing product, issued in 1828). 
 51. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,642,164 (filed Nov. 21, 2001) (issued Nov. 4, 2003) 
(claiming a frost-resistant insulating building material having asbestos as a possible 
component); U.S. Patent No. 4,546,024 (filed Dec. 5, 1983) (issued Oct. 8, 1985) (claiming 
load-bearing horizontal tiles that may be constructed from asbestos). 
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have given rise to harmful consequences include patents for various 
other chemical pollutants such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),52 
carcinogenic food and beverage additives such as some food, drug, and 
cosmetic (FD&C) dyes,53 and mechanical inventions such as the two-
stroke internal combustion engine.54  The proliferation of such patents—
in some cases even concurrent with attempts by other government 
agencies to ban the substances—evidences the inadequacies of our 
current laws.  At present, there is simply no connection between 
scientific evidence indicating that a substance has harmful effects, 
domestic and international attempts to ban the substance, and the 
patent incentive. 
II.  THE SCOPE OF PATENTABILITY 
A patent essentially provides to the patentee a temporary right to 
exclude others from manufacturing, selling, using, or importing a 
proprietary invention.  This concept was apparently first set forth in 
writing in the fourth century B.C. by Aristotle (who attributed the idea 
to Hippodamus),55 but Renaissance-era Venice provides the first known 
regulated system of granting patents.  In fact, according to one 
commentator, the Venetian Senate’s 1474 Act56 includes 
most of the essential features of a modern patent statute.  It 
defines its coverage (“devices”); provides for registration with a 
specific administrative agency; requires inventions to be “new 
and useful,” “reduced to perfection,” and “not previously made 
in this Commonwealth”; specifies a fixed term of ten years; and 
 
 52. PCBs were first synthesized in the late nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Environmental 
Literacy Council, Persistent Organic Pollutants, http://www.enviroliteracy.org 
/article.php/1176.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2006) (describing the history of PCBs).  PCBs were 
ultimately banned by Congress in 1976 due to their toxic effects.  Toxic Substances Control 
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2000)). 
 53. See, e.g., FDA, Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Color Additives Fact 
Sheet, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/cos-221.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (describing the 
history of various banned food dyes). 
 54. Two-stroke engines in snowmobiles and other off-road vehicles are a subject of 
much current controversy. Although they produce “as much harmful pollution in seven hours 
as a passenger car driven for 100,000 miles,” these engines are not yet banned domestically on 
a large scale.  Press Release, Envtl. Def., Envtl. Def. Blasts Snowmobile Pollution Standards 
(Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pressrelease.cfm?Content 
ID=2300. 
 55. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 2002). 
 56. Id. at 3. 
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sets forth a procedure to determine infringement, as well as a 
remedy.57 
Notably, however, the 1474 Act did not provide any statutory exclusions 
to patentability due to policy considerations such as an invention’s 
potential harm to public health, national security, or the environment.  
While this remains the case under current U.S. law, many other nations 
have chosen to incorporate such exclusions into their contemporary 
patent statutes.58  The current scope of patentability under the laws of 
the United States and foreign nations are briefly considered in this 
section. 
A.  A Brief Examination of Patentable Subject Matter in the United States 
U.S. patent law grants to inventors the temporary right to exclude 
others within this country from making, using, selling, or importing the 
patented invention, as defined by the “claims” of the patent.59  Violating 
any of these prohibitions is called infringing the patent, and a party who 
does so may be subject to civil penalties including an injunction, 
damages, and attorney fees.60  With some relatively minor exceptions, 
the right to exclude currently extends from the date the USPTO issues 
the patent, to a date twenty years from the filing date of the patent 
application.61  To obtain a patent, an inventor must satisfy a number of 
formal and substantive requirements.  These are intended to ensure the 
novelty and authenticity of the invention, as well as to require sufficient 
public disclosure in return for the right to exclude.  To check that these 
requirements are properly met, every patent application is evaluated by 
one or more professional Patent Examiners employed by the USPTO.62 
 
 57. Id. at 4. 
 58. See infra Part II.B. 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 60. Id. §§ 281–285. 
 61. Id. § 154(a)(2).  The exceptions are first, if the application refers to one or more 
earlier filed applications, the term begins to run from the earliest filing date of all of the 
applications to which the current application refers.  Id.  Second, the term of a patent 
resulting from an application filed before June 8, 1995, runs for the longer of either seventeen 
years from the date of issue of the patent or twenty years from the date of its application.  See 
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 55, at 59 (describing this exception).  Finally, the term of a 
patent may be extended due to delays in the examination process attributable to the USPTO.  
35 U.S.C. § 154(b). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 131. 
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1.  Formal Requirements 
To ensure adequate public disclosure of an invention in return for 
the temporary right to exclude others from its practice, a patent 
application must include a specification of the invention, to be published 
upon the grant of a patent, which contains the following: 
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor of carrying out his invention.63 
In addition to the development incentive offered by the possibility of a 
temporary monopoly, public disclosure via the patent specification is the 
primary mechanism by which patent law seeks to promote technological 
progress.  By requiring enough disclosure to allow others in the same 
field to copy, refine, and improve the patented invention, the written 
specification requirement is designed to ensure that inventors can build 
upon the prior ideas of others, presumably leading to more rapid 
progress in that field.  The patented invention itself must be precisely 
described in an application by at least one patentable “claim,” which 
must be supported by the language of the written disclosure, and which 
legally defines the subject matter of the invention.64  Finally, the USPTO 
also imposes a large number of additional formal and stylistic 
requirements upon patent applications.65  These are largely designed 
with clarity of the public record and agency efficiency in mind, and are 
not of particular concern here. 
2.  The Substantive Scope of Patentable Subject Matter 
U.S. patent law also imposes four substantive requirements to obtain 
a patent.  These include sufficient utility, novelty, and nonobviousness 
of the invention, and also a requirement that the invention fall within 
the confines of patentable subject matter.  Patentable subject matter is 
defined in the United States both by statute and by the common law.66  
The Patent Act states broadly that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
 
 63. Id. § 112. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., id. §§ 113, 115, 119 (requiring a drawing when necessary, an oath of 
originality by the inventor, and a statement claiming priority to any earlier filed applications). 
 66. Id. §§ 101–103. 
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matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”67  However, once Congress has spoken, it is the “province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”68 and the limits 
of patentable subject matter have been further developed at common 
law.  As a result, certain categories of inventions have been specifically 
excluded from patentable subject matter in the United States, including 
physical phenomena, abstract ideas, and naturally occurring substances 
that have not been purified or otherwise refined by the inventor.69  Thus, 
for example, a physicist may not patent a newly discovered theory, and a 
geologist may not patent a newly discovered mineral.70  In addition, for 
obvious national security reasons, separate federal legislation excludes 
from patentability “any invention or discovery which is useful solely in 
the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic 
weapon.”71 
Although the exclusions described above limit patentable subject 
matter in various narrowly defined ways, the courts have given only 
limited attention to the more general question of whether to exclude an 
invention from patentability merely because of its possible negative 
impacts upon society.  This exclusionary doctrine of so-called 
“beneficial utility”72 dates back at least to 1817, when the court in 
Lowell v. Lewis73 summarized the nineteenth-century view of the 
doctrine in stating that “the law requires . . . the invention should not be 
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of 
society.”74  However, beneficial utility no longer plays a significant role 
 
 67. Id. § 101. 
 68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 69. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119–20 (1853) (holding 
unpatentable the abstract idea of using electromagnetism to produce written characters at a 
distance); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding 
a purified form of naturally occurring adrenaline salt patentable, but suggesting that it would 
be unpatentable if the inactive organic substances in the naturally occurring salt had not been 
removed from the patented product). 
 70. The distinction between an abstract idea and an invented process is not entirely 
clearly defined, and it has been shifting towards allowing greater patentability in recent years.  
For example, computer programs and business methods are currently both patentable, if they 
produce a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000). 
 72. See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 55, at 216–28 (defining and describing 
the history and current status of the doctrine). 
 73. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 74. Id. at 1019. 
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in defining the boundaries of patentable subject matter in this country.  
For instance, in an opinion upholding the patentability of an invention 
that had the effect of misleading consumers as to the source of the 
purchased product,75 the Federal Circuit noted that “the principle that 
inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral 
or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years.”76  As a 
result, even inventions specifically designed to facilitate breaking the 
law may be deemed patentable.  For example, in Whistler Corp. v. 
Autotronics, Inc.,77 the court enforced a patent directed toward radar 
detectors designed to help motorists avoid speeding tickets.  In stating 
that the court “cannot and should not substitute its own views in place 
of those of . . . the several legislatures, or the Congress,”78 the Whistler 
court declined to carve out a legality-based exclusion to the broad 
statutory standard of patentable subject matter laid out in the U.S. 
Patent Act, instead indicating that this carving out should fall to 
Congress. 
In fact, the trend in recent decades has been for courts in the United 
States to define the bounds of patentable subject matter ever more 
broadly.  Other than the requirements of utility, novelty, and 
nonobviousness, Congress has carved out only two relatively minor 
statutory exceptions from patentable subject matter:  inventions the sole 
use of which is to build a nuclear weapon,79 and human clones.80  Thus, 
the bounds of patentable subject matter in this country currently 
incorporate no statutory or common law exclusions related to legality, 
public health, or the environment,81 and in fact the current U.S. practice 
is that “anything under the sun that is made by man” should be 
patentable.82  As a result, the USPTO routinely grants patents for 
inventions that have harmful impacts on public health and the 
 
 75. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 76. Id. at 1366–67. 
 77. Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 
 78. Id. at 1886. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 71. 
 80. However, Congress has recently passed a single morality-based statutory exclusion 
to prevent patenting of human clones:  “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
available under this Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing a 
human organism.”  Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 
101 (2004).  Furthermore, as previously noted, Congress has barred certain nuclear materials 
from patentability for national security reasons.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 80. 
 82. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. 
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
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environment, and is required by law to do so.83  This is true regardless of 
whether the harmful impacts of the invention are merely suspected or 
are known with scientific certainty, and it remains true even if the 
actions of other U.S. government agencies indicate a national policy to 
eliminate the subject matter of the invention from public use.  Figure 1 
below illustrates the broad scope of patentability under current U.S. 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Patentable Subject Matter in Foreign Laws and International Treaties 
1.  Exclusions for Harmful Inventions 
In contrast to the broad scope of patentable subject matter in the 
United States, the laws of many other nations incorporate provisions 
designed to remove the patent incentive for sufficiently harmful 
 
 83. Before outlining any exceptions and requirements, including the novelty 
requirement, § 102 states that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 102 
(2000) (emphasis added). 
Not
novel 
       Nuclear 
weapons 
 
  Human 
   clones 
Figure 1
The scope of patentability in the United States 
as of 2004, with areas excluded from 
patentability indicated by shading. In addition 
to the requirements of utility, novelty, and 
nonobviousness, Congress has carved out only 
two relatively minor statutory exceptions from 
patentable subject matter:  inventions the sole 
use of which is to build a nuclear weapon and 
human clones. 
Not useful 
Novel but 
obvious 
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inventions.  For example, Brazilian patent law provides a number of 
statutory exclusions from patentability, which limit the scope of 
patentable subject matter to exclude various categories of inventions for 
policy reasons.  These exclusions apply regardless of whether the 
invention otherwise meets the basic requirements of utility, novelty, and 
nonobviousness in the Brazilian patent code.  The Brazilian exclusions 
include not only nuclear technology and human clones84 as in the United 
States, but also “anything contrary to morals, standards of respectability 
and public security, order and health.”85 
The Brazilian exclusions to patentable subject matter are typical of 
precautionary exclusions in the patent laws of many nations.86  In 
general, nations have adopted similar exclusions to patentable subject 
matter based on at least five criteria:  morality, public policy (or public 
order), legality, public health, and environmental harm.  More 
specifically,87 of at least 142 nations having independent patent laws with 
clearly delineated patentability standards, as of 2004, approximately 104 
had a morality exclusion, 83 had a public policy or public order 
exclusion, 38 had a legality exclusion (barring patents on inventions the 
use of which would conflict with other national laws),88 21 had a public 
health exclusion,89 and 11 had an environmental harm exclusion.90  Only 
27 of the 142 nations, including the United States, did not exclude 
inventions from patentability based on any of these five factors.91  Figure 
2 illustrates the scope of patentability with sufficiently harmful 
inventions excluded. 
 
 84. Decreto No. 9.279, de 14 de maio de 1996, D.O.U. de 14.05.1996. (Brazil). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Alan J. Jacobs ed., 4th ed. 
2006) (summarizing the patent laws of over 150 nations and cooperative treaties). 
 87. The author has compiled the statistics cited in the text through an independent 
study of Patents Throughout the World.  Id. 
 88. In addition, nine nations specifically disclaim a legal exclusion.  For example, the 
patent laws of the United Kingdom provide that a patent shall not be granted “for an 
invention the publication or exploitation of which would be generally expected to encourage 
offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour,” but that “behaviour shall not be regarded as 
offensive, immoral or anti-social only because it is prohibited by any law in force in the 
United Kingdom.”  Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, §§ 1(3)–(4) (Eng.). 
 89. The nations whose patent laws are known to include a statutory public health 
exclusion are Costa Rica, Ghana, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Vietnam.  See supra note 87. 
 90. The eleven nations are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Mongolia, Peru, 
Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  See supra note 87. 
 91. See supra note 87. 
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2.  Exclusions for Beneficial Inventions 
At first glance, providing patent protection for inventions that have 
purely beneficial impacts appears entirely appropriate, and this is true 
with respect to incentivizing development of such inventions.  However, 
when monopoly pricing is combined with the tremendous disparity in 
wealth that exists between the people of various nations today, the 
result may be that only the wealthiest citizens gain access to beneficial 
products, some of which may be vital to maintain the public health.  To 
combat this possibility, many nations have historically excluded various 
beneficial inventions from patentability, although the number of such 
nations has been steadily decreasing under pressure from the United 
States and other industrialized countries.92  For example, prior to 2005, 
the patent law of India excluded the following from patentability: 
 
 92. For example, a United Nations survey in the 1970s showed that “about 90 
developing countries and a few developed countries including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland and Sweden had enacted national laws on patents which excluded 
pharmaceutical products from patent production.”  K. Balasubramaniam, Advisor & 
Coordinator, Health Action Int’l Asia–Pacific, Patent Policies and Pharmaceutical Prices, 
Not
novel 
Novel but
obvious 
 
 
 
Sufficiently 
harmful 
Not useful 
Figure 2
The scope of patentability with sufficiently 
harmful inventions excluded, as provided, for 
example, by the patent law of Brazil. Many 
other national laws and some international 
treaties exclude from patentability inventions 
deemed harmful to morality, public policy, 
legality, public health, and/or the environment. 
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(g) a method or process of testing applicable during the process 
of manufacture for rendering the machine, apparatus or other 
equipment more efficient or for the improvement or restoration 
of the existing machine, apparatus or other equipment or for the 
improvement or control of manufacture; 
(h) a method of agriculture or horticulture; [and] 
(i) any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic 
or other treatment of human beings or any process for a similar 
treatment of animals or plants to render them free of disease or 
to increase their economic value or that of their products.93 
Indian law further provided that for inventions “claiming substances 
intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or 
drug . . . no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the 
substances themselves.”94  In other words, prior to 2005, Indian law 
excluded from patentability efficiency testing methods, agricultural 
methods and products, and medical methods and products, including 
pharmaceutical drugs.  However, although a substantial number of 
developing nations have attempted to mitigate monopoly pricing of 
beneficial products through their domestic patent laws, regional and 
international treaties such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)95 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement)96 have forced those 
nations to undo these mitigating patentability exclusions and to provide 
patent protection equivalent to that of the most developed nations.97  
Figure 3 illustrates the scope of patentability with both sufficiently 
harmful and various beneficial inventions excluded. 
 
Lecture delivered to Post Graduate Diploma in Health Development, Faculty of Medicine at 
the University of Colombo (Oct. 16, 2004), http://www.haiap.org/unipaper.htm.  As of 1988, 
there were approximately fifty such nations.  Julio Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical 
Drugs:  Understanding the Pressures on Developing Countries 4 (Int’l Econ. Dept., The World 
Bank, Working Paper No. 502, 1990), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ 
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1990/09/01/000009265_3960929170142/Rendered/PDF/multi0p
age.pdf. 
 93. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, Acts of Parliament, 1970. 
 94. Id. 
 95. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 96. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
 97. For example, to comply with the TRIPs Agreement, India amended its Patent Act 
in 2005 to remove section 5, which had excluded pharmaceuticals from patentability.  Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005. 
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3.  Exclusions in International Treaties 
As noted above, a number of international treaties also govern 
patentability.  Rather than serving as distinct sources of law, these 
treaties generally require signatory nations to conform their national 
laws to the treaty provisions or face economic sanctions.  For example, 
the European Patent Convention,98 which governs the patent laws of 
thirty-one member states,99 provides that patents shall not be granted for 
“inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary 
 
 98. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 
[hereinafter European Patent Convention]. 
 99. A list of the thirty-one member states of the European Patent Organization (EPO) 
is available on the EPO Web site.  See EPO Member States, http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/members.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
Not useful 
Not 
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Figure 3
The scope of patentability with all sufficiently 
harmful and some beneficial inventions excluded, 
as exemplified by the patent law of India prior to 
2005.  In addition to excluding harmful inventions 
from patentability, Indian law also excluded 
certain beneficial inventions to preclude 
monopoly pricing for those inventions. The 
excluded categories included testing methods for 
improving manufacturing efficiency, agricultural 
methods and products, and perhaps most 
significantly, pharmaceutical drugs. 
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to ‘ordre public’ or morality.”100  Even more broadly, the Eurasian 
Patent Convention,101 ratified by ten Eurasian nations,102 provides that 
Eurasian patents shall not be granted for . . . inventions, the 
commercial use of which it is essential to prevent, for the 
purposes of protecting public order or morality, including the 
protection of the life and health of people and animals or the 
protection of plants, or in order to prevent serious damage being 
caused to the environment.103 
Significantly, the exclusions provided by the European and Eurasian 
conventions are mandatory, rather than optional.  In other words, the 
thirty-one states party to the European Patent Convention must 
incorporate a morality exclusion into their national patent laws, and the 
ten states party to the Eurasian Patent Convention must incorporate 
exclusions based on public morality, public health, and environmental 
harm.104 
In contrast, a second set of treaties allow for optional patentability 
exclusions for harmful inventions.  For example, NAFTA provides that 
[a] Party may exclude from patentability inventions if preventing 
in its territory the commercial exploitation of the inventions is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to nature or the environment, provided that the 
exclusion is not based solely on the ground that the Party 
prohibits commercial exploitation in its territory of the subject 
matter of the patent.105 
Similarly, the TRIPs Agreement provides that 
[m]embers may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation 
of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
 
 100. European Patent Convention, supra note 98, art. 53. 
 101. Eurasian Patent Convention, Sept. 9, 1994, Industrial Property Laws & Treaties, 
text 2-013, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/ea/ ea001en.pdf. 
 102. These nations are the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the 
Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 
Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO), States Party to the Convention, http://www.eapo.org/ 
eng/information/about.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
 103. Patent Regulations Under the Eurasian Patent Convention, ch. II, R. 3(4), Dec. 1, 
1995, Industrial Property Laws & Treaties, text 2-014, available at http://www.eapo.org/eng/ 
documents/doc/ea002en.pdf. 
 104. See supra notes 98–103. 
 105. NAFTA, supra note 95, art. 1709 (first emphasis added). 
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avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by domestic law.106 
However, since the patentability exclusions provided in NAFTA and 
the TRIPs Agreement are merely optional, neither treaty should be 
viewed as providing meaningful limits to the scope of patentability.  
Instead, these optional exclusions simply render NAFTA and the TRIPs 
Agreement compatible with the laws of nations already requiring 
exclusions for harmful inventions, such as the signatories to the 
European and Eurasian conventions. 
In fact, NAFTA and the TRIPs Agreement have the overall effect of 
significantly broadening patentability scope worldwide by forcing 
member nations to provide patents for all inventions other than those 
subject to the optional exclusions noted above.  For example, the TRIPs 
Agreement provides that aside from the optional exclusions, “patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application.”107  This apparently 
includes, inter alia, efficiency testing methods, agricultural methods, and 
pharmaceuticals, i.e., all of the exclusions carved out by Indian law.  
That the TRIPs Agreement requires patentability of these and other 
beneficial inventions is highly significant to the world economy.  As an 
agreement promulgated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
TRIPs Agreement applies to all WTO member nations,108 of which there 
are currently 149, with another thirty-two “observer” nations committed 
to eventual membership.109  Thus, the TRIPs Agreement—and to a 
lesser extent NAFTA110—essentially precludes all patentability 
 
 106. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 96, art. 27 (first emphasis added). The treaty also 
allows optional exclusions for medical methods, for animals, and for plants other than plant 
varieties, which must remain patentable.  Id. 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. See WTO, Intellectual Property (TRIPS), Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) 
[hereinafter WTO TRIPS FAQ] (noting that that the TRIPs Agreement “applies to all WTO 
members”). 
 109. See WTO, Understanding the WTO, Members, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (providing lists of current 
members and observers, and noting that “observers must start accession negotiations within 
five years of becoming observers”). 
 110. Note that NAFTA applies only to the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  See 
NAFTA, supra note 95. 
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exclusions designed to counteract monopoly pricing of beneficial 
inventions, in virtually every country in the world.111 
Not surprisingly, developing nations have searched for loopholes in 
the TRIPs Agreement that might allow them to continue the practice of 
excluding some beneficial products, particularly pharmaceuticals, from 
patentability.112  One possibility is to characterize the exclusions as 
necessary for public health, thus bringing them within the scope of the 
optional exclusions explicitly allowed by the TRIPs Agreement.113  
However, proving that limits to patentability are “necessary” may be 
difficult or impossible, and nations may not want to risk possible WTO 
trade sanctions if a dispute arises.  A second option is compulsory 
licensing, which is authorized by the TRIPs Agreement in cases of “a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in 
cases of public non-commercial use,”114 or if “the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”115  These conditions also 
may be difficult to meet, or may result in high prices for the product 
despite the compulsory license.  Furthermore, a license is useless to a 
nation that lacks the capability to manufacture the invention.  Finally, 
parallel imports are allowed by the TRIPs Agreement,116 enabling 
developing nations to import products from international resellers 
rather than exclusively from the patent holder, thus providing 
 
 111. One exception is that “least developed countries” have been granted an extension 
until 2016 to provide for patentability of pharmaceuticals.  WTO TRIPS FAQ, supra note 
108. 
 112. In fact, developing nations attended the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, 
Qatar, in November 2001, for the express purpose of finding legal strategies to mitigate the 
harmful effects of the TRIPs Agreement to their citizenry.  The result was the Doha 
Declaration, a political statement that affirmed that the TRIPs Agreement allows both 
compulsory licensing and parallel imports.  World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter 
Doha Declaration]. 
 113. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 96, art. 27.  The TRIPs Agreement also 
explicitly provides that “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.”  Id. art. 8(1). 
 114. Id. art. 31. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Doha Declaration, supra note 112; see also TRIPS and Public Health:  The 
Situation Before Cancún, http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/trips_e/health_background 
_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (noting that the TRIPs Agreement allows parallel 
imports). 
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competition between sources of the same product.  However, despite 
the presence of these various loopholes in the TRIPs Agreement, its 
general effect has been to broaden the worldwide scope of patentability 
and to raise pharmaceutical prices in developing nations.117 
III.  A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR THE SCOPE OF 
PATENTABILITY118 
From a purely economic standpoint, providing the broadest possible 
scope of patentability makes sense because it provides the greatest 
range of incentives and profits to inventors and to the manufacturers 
who fund their research.  However, as described above, this can have 
undesirable non-economic consequences, including damaging impacts to 
the environment and public health.  As has been illustrated, to 
counteract the undesirable consequences of incentivizing harmful 
inventions and offering monopolies that limit access to beneficial 
inventions, some national laws and international treaties have limited 
the permissible scope of patentability to exclude both harmful and 
beneficial inventions in various circumstances.  The scope of 
patentability should be limited still further.  This section provides a 
proposal for the appropriate scope of patentability in international law.  
The proposed scope would require utility, novelty, and nonobviousness, 
would uniformly exclude from patentability sufficiently harmful 
inventions, and would selectively exclude sufficiently beneficial 
inventions only in qualifying developing nations. 
A.  Harmful Inventions:  What to Exclude 
I propose that provisions be added to domestic laws and 
international treaties to universally remove the incentive to create 
 
 117. In India, implementation of the TRIPs Agreement will likely cause drug prices to 
rise dramatically.  For example, in 1995 the drug Zantac (generically known as ranitidine) 
retailed in India for 18.53 rupees, in the United Kingdom at the equivalent of 484 rupees (26.1 
times as much), and in the United States at the equivalent of 1050 rupees (56.7 times as 
much).  In Pakistan, which has an economy similar to India but allows pharmaceutical 
patents, Zantac retailed in 1992 for the equivalent of 261 rupees, 14.1 times the price in India 
three years later.  See Jean O. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents 
in India:  “Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering”? 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 6366, 1998), available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/JLWP0799.pdf. 
 118. In an earlier work, I outlined a related proposal for incorporating a precautionary 
principle into the patent laws of the United States.  See Shawn Kolitch, Comment, The 
Environmental and Public Health Impacts of U.S. Patent Law:  Making the Case for 
Incorporating a Precautionary Principle, 36 ENVTL. L. 221, 249−55 (2006).  Portions of Part 
III are gleaned from that work. 
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harmful inventions.  In the United States, for example, this would 
require amendment to the applicable patent statutes.  The U.S. 
Congress would need to amend 35 U.S.C. § 101, which currently reads:  
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”119  For purposes of U.S. law, I 
propose that Congress add to § 101 the phrase:  “However, a patent will 
not be granted for an invention the use of which is deemed sufficiently 
detrimental to the environment or public health.”  Likewise, 
comparable provisions should be added to the domestic laws of other 
nations, and international treaties should be modified to allow these 
domestic provisions. 
The essential policy question for undertaking to devise and 
implement provisions limiting the scope of patentability for harmful 
inventions is exactly what would be the new legal limits of patentable 
subject matter.  In other words, how detrimental is “sufficiently 
detrimental” to exclude an invention from patentability?  Presumably 
the answer to this question should balance environmental and public 
health interests on one hand, with both the development incentive and 
the economic interests of potential inventors and other would-be patent 
owners on the other hand.120 It is important to consider the policy 
question of where to draw the line for precautionary exclusion from 
patentability, while still maintaining a sufficient economic patent 
incentive to promote technological progress and innovation in 
appropriate areas. 
1.  Banned Substances 
No reasonable justification exists for maintaining the patent 
incentive to develop inventions involving substances that a government 
has clearly indicated should be removed from domestic production and 
use.  Therefore, as a matter of public policy, patent provisions should 
exclude from patentability all inventions claiming substances facing an 
imminent domestic production ban or phase out at the time of the 
patent application.121 
 
 119. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 120. A patent owner is not necessarily the inventor named on the patent.  For example, 
an employee of a corporation may (and typically does) assign to her employer all patent 
rights related to work done in the scope of her employment. 
 121. The same exclusion would apply to substances whose production is already 
banned.  However, this situation is unlikely to arise in practice because if an inventor cannot 
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Excluding banned (or nearly banned) substances from patentability 
would merely remove the patent incentive to invent in areas where 
regulatory action leading toward a ban already clearly indicates 
government recognition that a substance is harmful.  Because bans are 
typically enacted only in the face of incontrovertible evidence regarding 
the harmful effects of a substance, placing such limits would essentially 
allow removal of the patent incentive at least for inventions known with 
scientific certainty to be harmful.  More generally, the practice would 
close an existing loophole that maintains the patent incentive during the 
interval between regulatory action leading towards a ban on production 
of a substance, and the production ban taking final effect.  Removing 
the patent incentive in such cases is inherently reasonable because an 
imminent ban or phase out of production strongly suggests that use of 
the banned substance in a proposed invention is “sufficiently 
detrimental” to exclude the invention from patentability. 
Similarly, patentable subject matter should exclude inventions 
involving substances facing an imminent ban or phase out on domestic 
use—as opposed to production—at the time of the patent application.  
Typically, a ban on domestic use will be accompanied by a production 
ban, but in rare cases a regulation may ban domestic use of a substance 
without a commensurate ban on domestic production, indicating that 
the substance still may be used in other nations.  One might argue that 
the patent incentive in such cases should be preserved to induce 
prospective inventors to “improve” these fields of invention for the 
benefit of companies producing and exporting the related products.  
However, inducing research in alternative technologies by removing the 
patent incentive for clearly harmful substances would better serve 
ultimate policy goals, including the articulated purpose of patents under 
U.S. law to promote the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”122  Of 
course, removing the patent incentive does not in and of itself constitute 
a ban of any sort, and excluding from patentability a substance whose 
domestic use is banned would in no way affect either domestic 
production or foreign use of previously patented inventions related to 
the substance.  Rather, limiting the patent incentive would serve only as 
 
produce the invention domestically, there would be little reason to pursue a U.S. patent.  In 
the strange scenario where domestic production was banned but domestic use was not 
banned, an inventor planning to produce the invention in another country conceivably might 
pursue a U.S. patent to prevent other foreign manufacturers from selling similar products in 
this country.  In that unlikely event, the exclusion should apply. 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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a subtle force to move future technological development in a more 
beneficial direction. 
2.  Other Inherently Reasonable Exclusions 
Aside from imminent regulatory bans on production and use of a 
substance, other indicators of scientific certainty regarding the harmful 
impacts of the substance should be used to exclude related inventions 
from patentability as “sufficiently detrimental.”  Such alternative 
indicators, which often serve as the precursors of bans, could include 
reports by scientific panels, scientific review articles, conference 
proceedings, and so forth.  While such a change in our patent incentive 
scheme might not prevent the production and use of some products 
containing undesired substances, development of those products might 
be significantly decreased in favor of safer alternatives for which the 
patent incentive remains intact.  In general, removing the patent 
incentive immediately upon the arrival of scientific consensus regarding 
a substance’s harmful impacts, rather than waiting years or decades for 
the announcement of a regulatory ban or phase out of the substance, 
seems most consistent with the notion of using patents to promote 
developments and advancements. 
3.  Scientific Uncertainty and True Precaution 
Most controversially, but also perhaps most importantly, a truly 
precautionary step would be to exclude from patentability inventions 
merely suspected of causing sufficient harm to the environment or public 
health.  For instance, an invention’s potential harm could be assessed in 
consultation with the agencies that provide lists of substances that are 
banned or otherwise known with relative certainty to have “sufficiently 
detrimental” environmental or public health effects.  In borderline 
cases, risk assessments could be performed with appropriate domestic 
agencies.  Although the precise standards for such assessments would 
have to be defined with regard to patentability, these details could 
presumably be promulgated by appropriate agency regulations.  
Whereas the political climate might make compromising patent rights in 
favor of environmental concerns an unpopular notion, the practical 
obstacles to instituting a well-defined precautionary standard of 
patentability seem to be surmountable. 
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B.  Beneficial Inventions and Selective Exclusion 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the 
economic and social effects of granting patents for beneficial inventions, 
both common sense and available data indicate that doing so will 
increase prices, limiting availability of beneficial products in developing 
nations, while providing greater profits to manufacturers in developed 
nations.  To counteract this, domestic and international laws should 
selectively allow developing nations to exclude certain classes of 
inventions from patentability.  Excluded categories should include, at a 
minimum, agricultural methods and products, and medical methods and 
products, but should preferably be extended to all inventions sufficiently 
beneficial to public welfare.  Nations allowed to make these exclusions 
should include at least those thirty-two member nations recognized as 
“least-developed” by the WTO,123 and should preferably include all 
nations whose GDP falls below a certain threshold level.  For example, 
the exclusions could be allowed to all nations having a GDP less than 
the worldwide mean or median GDP, which would effectively limit 
monopoly pricing to only wealthier nations.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
proposed scope of patentability with sufficiently harmful inventions 
universally excluded and with sufficiently beneficial inventions 
selectively excluded. 
Unfortunately, as indicated by the advent of the TRIPs Agreement, 
international law appears to be evolving towards a broader scope of 
patentability rather than a narrower one.  This is due primarily to the 
influence of the United States and other developed nations, which have 
the most to gain from a worldwide policy of broad patentability.  
Although the language of the TRIPs Agreement allows some flexibility 
in national laws that seek to preclude patentability of harmful 
inventions, this language should be mandatory rather than optional.  
Furthermore, rather than preventing developing nations from excluding 
pharmaceuticals and other beneficial inventions from patentability, the 
TRIPs Agreement and other international treaties should explicitly 
allow these exclusions.  This would effectively require developed 
nations to recoup research and development costs from within their own 
ranks, while providing the benefits of the research to rich and poor 
countries alike.  However, so long as the wealthiest and most developed 
nations continue to set the policy agenda of the WTO and other 
 
 123. See WTO, Understanding the WTO, Least Developed Countries, 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) 
(providing a list of these nations). 
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international trade organizations, such beneficial reforms to 
international patent law are unlikely to occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law purports to be an incentive system, in which the lure of 
temporary monopoly power spurs both the development of new 
technologies and public disclosure of the resulting innovations.  
However, if the patent incentive is offered indiscriminately, both the 
development and the monopoly power may come at a high domestic 
and international price.  Some innovation has undesirable 
consequences, and maintaining the patent incentive without regard to 
the harmful impacts of an invention may result in the development of 
harmful technologies and may slow the development of safer 
alternatives.  On the other hand, some innovation is so beneficial that 
the grant of even a temporary monopoly may limit access to an 
invention to the wealthy, and thus conflict with basic notions of fairness 
Not useful 
Not
novel Novel but 
obvious 
Sufficiently 
beneficial 
Sufficiently 
harmful 
Figure 4
The author’s proposed patentability scope. 
The proposed scope would require utility, 
novelty, and nonobviousness, would 
uniformly exclude sufficiently harmful 
inventions, and would selectively exclude 
sufficiently beneficial inventions only in 
qualifying developing nations (as indicated 
by the dashed boundary line).
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and human rights.  This is particularly true with respect to 
pharmaceuticals, medical methods and devices, and agricultural 
methods and products. 
The scope of patentable subject matter can—and should—be shaped 
to counteract the problems described above.  In the domestic laws of all 
nations, the patent incentive should be removed for many harmful 
inventions by excluding from patentability all subject matter known or 
suspected to have sufficiently detrimental impacts on the environment 
or public health.  Furthermore, to give universal access to beneficial 
medical and agricultural advances, the patent incentive for this subject 
matter should be retained only in nations whose citizens can afford to 
pay the resulting monopoly prices.  In other nations, and particularly in 
the thirty-two member nations recognized as “least-developed” by the 
WTO, this beneficial subject matter should be excluded from 
patentability.  Finally, all relevant international treaties, particularly the 
TRIPs Agreement, should be amended to allow these exclusions from 
patentable subject matter.  Unfortunately, this would require a reversal 
of the current trend of expanding patentable subject matter for the 
primary benefit of industrialized nations. 
 
